

by directing its inferences from the accidental to the essential, also by extending immensely its scope, and so enabling it to draw inferences not merely from impressions or recollections of things, but from conceptions of their properties. By volition, or the exercise of will, we are able to enforce the conclusions of reason, and we are thus equipped with the means of guiding ourselves through difficulties which, in the case of the lower animals, are met by the injunctions of directive instinct. But reason, consciousness, and will share their authority over us with a multitude of impulsive instincts—selfish and social, reproductive and provident, cruel and kind, aesthetic and ethical—which vary greatly in strength from individual to individual, but can generally set up from amongst their number, in each one of us, some tyrant, or tyrants—some "favourite" propensities—which our conscious reason and our will are unable to coerce. But, if assisted by habit, they may be able to prevail.

**Habits.** acquired sometimes by will power, more generally by imitation, or education (a form of imitation) may be employed to facilitate the outflow of particular impulses that are commended by reason, and proportionately to weaken the influence of others of which reason disapproves. But, if entrusted too confidingly with the direction of our behaviour, habit may enslave us, and grow into such a tyranny as we employed it to

dethrone.

Our path is indeed strewn with pitfalls. We have liberty such as is denied to the insects ; but it leads us through dangers from which their lives are free.

Features of the body vary from individual to individual in size, shape or colour : so do instinctive impulses vary in strength ; and, since